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Based on real-time trade data from the Swiss franc overnight interbank repo
market and SIX Interbank Clearing (SIC) – the Swiss real-time gross settlement
(RTGS) system – we are able to gain valuable insights on the daytime value of
money and its determinants: First, an implicit hourly interbank interest rate can
be derived from the intraday term structure of the overnight rate. We thereby
provide evidence that an implicit intraday money market exists. Second, we show
that after the introduction of the foreign exchange settlement system CLS the
value of intraday liquidity has increased during the hours of the CLS settlement
cycle. Third, the turnover as well as the liquidity in SIC inﬂuence the intraday
rate correspondingly. These facts provide evidence for the cost of immediacy.
Features like RTGS, delivery-versus-payment and payment-versus-payment sub-
stitute credit risk with liquidity risk which in turn increases the value of intraday
liquidity. The analysis is central bank policy relevant insofar as diﬀerent designs
of intraday liquidity facilities and diﬀerent collateral policies result in diﬀerent
intraday term structures for the overnight money market.
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1 Introduction
The institutional framework through which central banks provide the ﬁnan-
cial system with intraday and overnight liquidity share a number of features.
Martin/McAndrews (2008) provide a summary of the literature according to
which one crucial diﬀerence between intraday and overnight liquidity remains
puzzling: There is an interbank market for overnight (ON) reserves whereas
there seems to be no interbank market for intraday reserves. We provide em-
pirical evidence that the ON rate in the Swiss franc interbank money market
shows a clear downward trend throughout the operating day of the SIX In-
terbank Clearing (SIC), the Swiss real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system.
Based on real-time trade data from the Swiss franc repo platform we derive an
implicit intraday interest rate from the intraday term structure of the ON mar-
ket. Therefore, in Switzerland, like in some other countries as well, an implicit
intraday interbank market for money exists.
We interpret this as evidence for the cost of immediacy of RTGS systems
postulated by Kahn/Roberds (2001). Using a neoclassical monetary model they
show that if intraday credit is available from the central bank on a collateralized
basis, RTGS will impose an intraday liquidity cost. This interpretation is also
consistent with the following evidence found that the implicit intraday interest
rate depends on the turnover as well as on the liquidity in SIC. This also mirrors
the theoretical ﬁndings in VanHoose (1991) and Angelini (1998) who apply a
model of a bank’s intraday liquidity management in an RTGS system.
Our results also highlight that a remarkable change has taken place after
the introduction of the foreign exchange settlement system Continuous Linked
Settlement (CLS) in 2002.1 During the opening hours of CLS the level of the im-
plicit intraday interest rate has increased. This is evidence for the presumption
by Baglioni/Monticini (2008) that the introduction of CLS and the correspond-
ing payment-versus-payment (PVP) mechanisms could trigger the development
of an intraday money market. Indeed, after the introduction of CLS the value
of intraday liquidity increased and, hence, the implicit price for intraday credits
rose. Incorporating settlement features such as PVP or delivery-versus-payment
(DVP) mechanisms into RTGS systems can increase the number and value of
time critical payments that have to be settled until a certain time of the day.
As a consequence, banks face higher intraday liquidity needs in order to fulﬁll
their settlement obligations.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has provided free and collateralized intra-
1For more information on CLS and its settlement mechanism see Kahn/Roberds (2000).3
day liquidity on the basis of repo transactions since 1999. Neither before nor
after the introduction of this standing facility has an explicit interbank market
for Swiss franc intraday liquidity developed. The use of the intraday liquidity
facility is pegged by the opportunity costs of collateral and transaction costs.
These costs are not equal among participants of the Swiss franc repo platform.
Evidence for this is that some banks do make use of the SNB’s intraday facility
and some don’t. The availability of intraday credits from SNB’s intraday credit
facility however also aﬀects the bank’s term in the ON market. Regression re-
sults based on bank speciﬁc information show a diﬀerent willingness to pay for
ON funds of banks that use the SNB’s intraday facility and such that don’t.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a short overview
of SIC and the SNB’s intraday facility. Section 3 describes the data stemming
from the Eurex repo trading platform and SIC. In the subsequent section the
econometric methodology is presented. The last two sections discuss the results
and provide concluding remarks.4
2 SIC and the SNB’s intraday liquidity facility
2.1 SIX Interbank Clearing
Having started operations in 1987, SIC is one of the oldest RTGS systems.2
Initially, design and architecture of the system were rather simple. The three
main building blocks consisted in the non-allowance of intraday liquidity (in
contrast to overdrafts in Fedwire and collateralized intraday credits in Target2),
a central queuing mechanism and the strict ”ﬁrst in - ﬁrst out” (FIFO) rule for
payments processing and settlement. The transfer of funds in SIC is subject
to the strict condition that the bank issuing the transfer order holds adequate
balances on its SIC account. In the event of insuﬃcient coverage, the transfer
order is automatically held pending until covering funds have accumulated in
the account through incoming payments or any form of credits by the SNB.
The system automatically retries to settle pending payments on a continuous
basis. The settlement algorithm stayed the same until 1994 when priorities
were introduced.3 In December 2001 the settlement algorithm was enriched
with circles processing.4
Ever since the early stages of planning, it has been envisaged to provide for
the settlement of various interbank payment services in SIC. This process started
in 1995 with the integration of the securities settlement system SECOM of SIX
SIS AG (SIS), the Swiss International Central Security Depository (ICSD). This
link allows a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) mechanism in securities settlement
by settling both the cash and the security side on a trade-by-trade (gross set-
tlement) basis. In 2002 the process of integration has been ended so far by
the integration of CLS. This was done in a rather straightforward and simple
way. All CLS members were given a special subaccount in SIC. This account
serves the only purpose of settling CLS related cover payments. For all other
payments the main accounts are used.5 SIC operations start at 17.00 p.m. the
day before the actual value date. End of day is scheduled for 16.15 p.m. Within
the SIC settlement day, CLS settlement cycles take place on an hourly basis
from 7 a.m. to 12 a.m. on the actual value date. CLS members have to meet a
2For a comprehensive description of the system see Heller, Nellen and Sturm (2000).
3From an individual participant’s perspective, the settlement sequence of payments is determined
by the chosen priority. Within a speciﬁc order of priority, the FIFO-rule applies.
4In case the system is not able to settle payments for a certain period of time, the algorithm is
searching for bilateral oﬀ-setting payments. On average circles processing is activated once to twice
daily.
5Other interbank payment services that are settled in SIC comprise cash ﬂows resulting from
retail payment clearinghouses and the exchanges (or their central counterparties) such as SIX Swiss
Exchange (SIX x-clear), Scoach and Eurex (Eurex Clearing).5
pay-in schedule set by CLS in due time. This requires large amounts of reserve
balances to be transferred during speciﬁc time slots. However, SIC serves as
a settlement system for both, large-value payments and retail payments. The
overwhelming number of transactions is retail oriented whereas the overwhelm-
ing value of payments stems from large-value interbank payments. Risk and
eﬃciency considerations were the deciding factors that convinced the Swiss ﬁ-
nancial market and the SNB to opt for such an integrative solution. SIC allows
for ﬁnal settlement in central bank money and concentration of settlement al-
lows for pooling of liquidity. The size and time criticality of CLS payments,
however, led to a solution with two separate accounts for CLS participants.
2.2 The SNB’s Intraday Liquidity Facility
The main intention of the SNB’s intraday liquidity facility is to facilitate the
settlement of payments via SIC and foreign exchange transactions in the CLS
subaccounts. All banks that have access to the Swiss franc repo market can
obtain intraday funds from the SNB. The intraday liquidity has to be covered
with 110% of collateral eligible for SNB repos. As intraday liquidity has to be
repaid by the end of the value day, it is not considered for the fulﬁllment of the
minimum reserve and liquidity requirements. SNB provides intraday credits on
an interest rate free basis. Banks can repay the intraday liquidity drawn at
any time during the day. This standing facility has been introduced in 1999
and has since then been used intensively by market participants. Starting with
the introduction of intraday liquidity speciﬁcally designated for CLS (”Intraday
CLS”) the average monthly drawn volume increased by CHF 5 bn to approx.
CHF 8 bn (see ﬁgure 1).6
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Figure 1: Average Monthly Drawn Intraday Volume (in bn CHF)
3 Data and stylized facts
In June 1999 the Swiss franc repo trading, clearing and settlement system was
launched and has since then provided market participants with an integrated
platform for repo transactions. Almost all interbank repo transactions in Swiss
francs are traded on the Eurex repo trading platform and only a negligible
amount is carried out over-the-counter (OTC).7 The Eurex repo trading plat-
form is thus the representative market for repo transactions in Swiss francs.
The data used in this study consists of interest rates that were charged for
Swiss franc ON repo transactions between commercial banks on the Eurex repo
trading platform. In particular, each data point provides information on the
two banks involved, the interest rate charged, the collateral category chosen
as well as the cash amount provided. The sample covers all transactions that
were concluded from 18 June 1999 to 15 September 2008. Since the SNB’s
provision of reserves changed considerably after September 2008, we exclude
this period. The ON repo market is the most liquid market segment of the
Swiss franc repo market. During the considered period a total of 130 banks
acted either as cash taker or provider. Since the introduction of the platform
in 1999 the average number of active banks as well as the average daily volume
increased signiﬁcantly. In 2000 9 banks traded an average daily volume of CHF
320 million, while in 2008 approximately 50 banks traded CHF 6,5 billion per
7For a detailed overview on the characteristics and development of the Swiss franc repo market
see Jordan (2007) and Kraenzlin (2007).7
day. Overall the dataset consists of 100,200 ON transactions conducted on 2,319
business days.8 Approximately 60% of the ON liquidity was transacted during
the last two hours of the business day (between 2 and 4 p.m.).
We split participants on the Swiss franc repo market into two categories:
Banks that actively use the SNB’s intraday facility (”Intraday Users”) and such
that do not (”No Intraday Users”). The classiﬁcation into these two bank cate-
gories is done as follows: Up to the date on which a bank has used the intraday
facility for the ﬁrst time, it is considered as ”No Intraday User”. All subsequent
transactions are considered for the ”Intraday Users” category. Figure 2 shows
that the ”Intraday Users” conclude on average two-thirds of the ON volume be-
tween 2 and 4 p.m. This behavioral pattern suggest that the ”Intraday Users”
prefer to draw from the SNB’s intraday facility in the morning in order to settle
payments in SIC or CLS and repay the intraday liquidity in the afternoon by
concluding ON transactions. The ”No Intraday Users”, in contrast, transact
approximately 60% of the volume until noon, whereof they are especially active
from 9 to 10 a.m. In order to settle payments in SIC these banks therefore favor
to obtain the necessary funds directly in the ON market. In this case the ON
liquidity virtually exerts a dual function, namely as intraday liquidity to settle
payments and ON liquidity as funding tool. Therefore, ”No Intraday Users”
act as cash takers relatively more often during the early morning hours. On
average, ”Intraday Users” accounted for approximately 85% (90%) of the ON
volume before (after) the introduction of CLS.
Furthermore, we use data on the volume of unsettled payments in SIC.
The hourly volume of unsettled payments in SIC is derived by subtracting the
settled volume up to that hour from total daily turnover in SIC. The volume of
unsettled payments in SIC (PU t) is derived by subtracting the cumulative hourly
turnover (Ut) from total daily turnover (UT). Turnover generated by the SNB
which results, among others, from monetary policy operations is excluded. In
January 1999, on average only 28% of the volume of payments had been settled
by 1 p.m.; by September 2008, this ﬁgure increased to 83%. The increase in
volume of settled payments can mainly be subscribed to the positive impacts of
intraday liquidity.
8These transactions are fully comparable with each other as they are against SNB eligible collateral
and as the collateral is not subject to a haircut (or initial margin). No haircut applies as the net
exposure a party holds vis-a-vis each participant is calculated twice daily. If the net exposure exceeds
the unilaterally deﬁned variation margin, a margin call is triggered. Credit and market risks are
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Figure 2: Hourly ON volume in % of total
4 Methodology
With the data at hand two types of regressions are run. The ﬁrst regression
estimates the implicit intraday term structure of the ON interest rates and the
second regression relates the pattern found in the ﬁrst regression to the condi-
tions prevalent in SIC, namely the intraday liquidity usage and the turnover.
All regressions are run for the whole sample, namely from 18 June 1999 to 15
September 2008 as well as for two sub-sample periods.9 The introduction date
of CLS on 10 September 2002 is considered as a structural break. This is done
in order to investigate whether the introduction of PVP for foreign exchange
transactions, namely the introduction of CLS, increased the cost of immediacy.
An increase in the implicit price for intraday credits would validate the hypoth-
esis by Baglioni/Monticini (2008) that CLS has fostered the establishment of
an implicit market for intraday credits.
All regressions are ﬁrst run for the banking system as a whole. However,
as seen in ﬁgure 2, the ”No Intraday Users” conclude signiﬁcantly more ON
trades in the morning than the ”Intraday Users”. We expect that the use of the
SNB’s intraday facility lowers the banks’ willingness to pay high ON rates in the
morning. By drawing intraday liquidity, a bank can prefund its liquidity needs
9The last two days of the minimum reserve period as well as the last day of the month are excluded
from the regression as ON rates tend to be particularly volatile on these days. See Benito et.al. (2006)
for an empirical analysis on the volatility of the Euro ON interest rate (EONIA).9
to settle the payments either in SIC or CLS early in the day. Later in that day,
when ON rates are expected to be lower, the bank can repay the intraday credit
by concluding an ON transaction on the interbank market. Hence, to evaluate
if the banks’ willingness to transact and pay in the ON market depends on the
use of the SNB’s intraday facility, the regressions are also run for these two bank
categories.
4.1 Estimation of the intraday term structure
In order to measure the implicit intraday interest rate we closely follow the
approach by Baglioni/Monticini (2008). Let t =1 ,...,8 denote the time bands
during the day, with t = 1 being the ﬁrst time band from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m. and
t = 8 the last time band from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m.10 Transactions are settled imme-
diately after the trade is concluded. Once a trade is concluded and matched, the
securities are instantaneously blocked and a payment message with high priority
is sent to SIC. Given the availability of securities and funds, settlement usually
takes place within a few seconds. Repayment of all ON transactions concluded
on the Swiss franc repo market is automatically triggered by SIS at 7:50 a.m.
Hence, compared to an ON transaction concluded at 10 a.m., the time length of
an ON transaction at 9 a.m. is one hour longer. The set of hourly interest rates
[r1,r 2,...,r 8] thus represents the ”intraday term structure” of the ON rates and,
therefore, the intraday price of money. In contrast to Baglioni/Monticini (2008),
rt represents the hourly volume weighted interest rate.
To account for day-to-day diﬀerences in the level of ON rates which may,
for example, result from interest rate hikes or day speciﬁc tensions, we derive
the hourly interest rate diﬀerential (¯ rt). The hourly interest rate diﬀerential is
calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the volume weighted interest rate
(rt) charged on overnight loans for each hourly band (t =1 ,...,7 or 8) and the
ON rate over the entire day (rT). Finally, this diﬀerential is used to obtain the
net intraday term structure.
To estimate the term structure of the ON interest rate we run a least square
dummy variable regression. We thereby test whether the overnight rate signif-
icantly depends on hourly dummies (di =1i ft = i and di = 0 otherwise) for
each opening hour of the Swiss franc repo market. The time band t =1( f r o m8
to 9 a.m.) is used as reference variable and is represented by the constant (α).
εt are the regression residuals.
10Banks can conclude trades on the Swiss franc repo market starting at 7 a.m. However, as trans-
actions are seldom concluded between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., the ﬁrst time band is deﬁned to take place
between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.10
¯ rt = α +
8 
i=2
βidi + εt (1)
Based on these regression results we can derive a synthetic measure of the
hourly interest rate charged in the Swiss franc repo market, by calculating the
following equation:
¯ rt =¯ r1 − s · t (2)
where ¯ r1 represents the interest rate diﬀerence for the ﬁrst time band, s the
synthetic value and t the time elapsed during the day. The coeﬃcient s basically
shows the decline of ON rates during the day and is a measure for the decrease
in willingness to pay for ON funds towards the end of the day. The average daily
synthetic value as well as the synthetic value for the time bands s8−12 (during
the CLS settlement cycle) and s12−16 (when the CLS settlement is ﬁnished) are
calculated.11
4.2 Explaining the intraday term structure
As set out in Angelini (1998), the hourly ON interest rate theoretically depends
on the volume of unsettled payments in the payment system. In order to explain
the intraday term structure we account for the banks’ liquidity needs by taking
the volume of unsettled payments as an explanatory variable. However, the
degree of liquidity stress that the volume to be settled exerts on a bank depends
on the actual liquidity available in the system.12 We account for this by using
the hourly outstanding intraday liquidity drawn from the SNB’s intraday facility
as the second explanatory variable. We expect that a high volume of unsettled
payments in SIC increases liquidity stress and hence banks’ willingness to pay
higher ON rates. High hourly outstanding intraday liquidity in turn leads to
a lower willingness to pay and hence a ﬂatter intraday term structure. Such
results would validate the hypothesis that RTGS systems favor the development
of an implicit market for intraday funds, or in theoretical parlor, RTGS systems
impose a cost of immediacy.
As mentioned in subsection 2.2, banks can either draw intraday liquidity
for SIC or for CLS speciﬁc subaccounts in SIC. Intraday liquidity designated
11The average hourly synthetic value is determined by dividing the diﬀerence between d8 and the
constant by the number of time bands.
12We only look at the two groups. Hence we account for the intraday liquidity on a group level
rather than on an individual bank level. As a consequence, no direct eﬀects of liquidity drawings by
individual banks are considered.11
for CLS is in general used in CLS subaccounts until 12 a.m. Usually, banks
subsequently transfer remaining balances on their CLS subaccounts to their
SIC main accounts. Consequently, banks normally use these funds only after
12 a.m. for settlement of payments in the main accounts of SIC. The liquidity
variable, It, is thus the hourly outstanding intraday volume drawn for main
accounts plus the hourly outstanding volume of intraday liquidity drawn for
CLS subaccounts. The latter variable is set to zero for the time before 12 a.m.13
13Banks can repay intraday liquidity at any time during the day. If this has not been the case,
repayment will automatically be activated by SIS at 3 p.m. As a consequence the hourly intraday
volume need not be the amount of intraday liquidity drawn from the SNB’s intraday facility. In the
following, we account for the fact that repayment of intraday liquidity was done before 3 p.m.12
5 Regression results
5.1 Estimation of the intraday term structure
The regression results are displayed in table 2 and plotted in ﬁgures 3 and 4. The
ﬁrst three regressions estimate the implicit intraday term structure for the entire
sample (1), for the time period before (2) and after the introduction of CLS (3).
All three regressions show a clear downward pattern of the ON interest rate
throughout the opening hours of the Swiss franc repo market. In the morning
(afternoon) participants paid approximately 1bp (3bp) above (below) the daily
volume weighted ON rate. Furthermore, regressions (2) and (3) reveal that the
introduction of CLS marks a structural break. After the introduction of CLS,
ON rates stay as high as at the beginning of the day until the end of the CLS
settlement cycle at noon. Only from then on the intraday term structure follows
the beforehand seen clear downward pattern. In addition, the diﬀerence between
opening and closing intraday rates has become smaller after the introduction
of CLS. Overall, regression results provide evidence that the value of intraday
money has increased during the hours of the CLS settlement cycle. This can be
taken as evidence that the introduction of PVP for foreign exchange settlement
has increased the cost of immediacy. Before PVP a bank could delay paying
its leg of a transaction until it was convenient and less expensive. With the
introduction of CLS and hence PVP, banks must make their payments at a
speciﬁc time during the day – which is relatively early in Switzerland – at a
time where there is competition from other payment needs.14 We estimate the
mark-up on hourly ON rates due to CLS to be approximately 0.50bp per hour,
leading to a total of roughly 1.5bp for the CLS settlement cycle.15
The bank group speciﬁc regressions (4)-(7), where we diﬀer between ”Intra-
day Users” and ”No Intraday Users”, show that the ON rate gradually declines
for both bank groups during the day. Figure 4 plots the intraday term structure.
Before the introduction of CLS the two bank groups’ willingness to pay diﬀered
signiﬁcantly: ”Intraday Users” paid approximately 2.8bp more for ON funds in
the morning than in the evening, while ”No Intraday Users” paid around 5bp
more. This is intuitive as the latter group’s overall willingness to pay a pre-
mium for ON funds in the morning is higher than for those banks that make
14In contrast to our ﬁndings Baglioni/Monticini (2008) ﬁnd a declining implicit intraday term
structure throughout the day in a sample that covers a period after the introduction of CLS. A
possible explanation here fore may be the diﬀerence in relative importance of CLS banks in the
respective markets. In markets where CLS banks are the dominant players, such as in Switzerland,
the implicit cost of intraday funding during CLS hours is more likely to increase.
15To quantify the average hourly mark-up we sum up the diﬀerences between the ¯ r after CLS −
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Figure 3: Intraday term structure (in bp)
use of the SNB’s intraday facility. The ”Intraday Users” can get liquidity at an
interest of zero at the SNB and still have the opportunity to get less expensive
ON funds in the evening. At the end of the day the diﬀerence in willingness to
pay converges.
After the introduction of CLS the hourly interest rate diﬀerential during the
CLS settlement cycle remains for both groups as high as at the beginning of
the day. The introduction of CLS again marks a structural break. It is evident
that the diﬀerence between the two bank groups’ willingness to pay remains
stable at the level of approximately 2bp and does not converge to zero as was
the case before the introduction of CLS. We would expect the willingness to pay
for ON funds as intraday liquidity at the end of the day to be the same for both
groups since almost all payments are settled. A necessary condition for such a
price diﬀerence is non-anonymous trading. This applies for the Eurex trading
platform.16 The lack of trade anonymity may have fostered price diﬀerence
between participants.17 However, non-anonymous trading is not a suﬃcient
explanation for the non-convergence to occur and remains puzzling. Finally, it
is evident that the diﬀerence between the beginning and end of day interest rate
diﬀerential (¯ r8−¯ r1) for ”No Intraday Users” decreased from 5bp to 3.5bp whereas
it stays at the level of 3pb for ”Intraday Users”. The decrease in diﬀerence for
16On the Swiss franc repo market an interbank relationship has to be enabled by both banks. In the
period of observation roughly 25% of all potential interbank relationships were activated bilaterally.
17Such a price diﬀerence should not be evidenced in an anonymous interbank repo market where
a central counterparty (CCP) is present.14
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Figure 4: Term structure w/r to bank categories (in bp)
”No Intraday Users” stands for a lower volatility of ON rates throughout the
day.
Table 1 provides information on the average hourly synthetic value. For the
entire period of observation (1) the average hourly decline in price of money
is estimated to be 0.51bp. This demonstrates that ON funds are less valuable
the more time has elapsed in the trading day as these funds exert less the dual
function, namely as intraday liquidity to settle payments and ON liquidity as
funding tool. This is in line with the result that Baglioni/Monticini (2008)
obtain for the unsecured interbank money market in Euro. The decline in
prices for the two subsamples, before (2) and after the introduction of CLS (3)
mark a slight change from 0.52bp to 0.43bp. The change gets more visible if
we consider the synthetic values for diﬀerent time bands, namely during (s8−12)
and after the CLS settlement cycle (s12−16). The synthetic values after and
before CLS are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for both time bands. The synthetic value
decreases constantly for the period before CLS. After the introduction of CLS
the synthetic value stays constant or even slightly increases in the ﬁrst time
band and then decreases more sharply in the second time band. Participants in
the Swiss franc repo market thus value ON funds in the afternoon less valuable
than during the settlement hours of CLS. Diﬀerently said, the value of intraday
money during the hours of the CLS settlement cycle has become higher after
the introduction of CLS. The average daily synthetic value is also evidence that15
the willingness to pay of ”Intraday Users” decreased by less than that of ”No
Intraday Users”. While ”Intraday Users” pay almost the same intraday interest
rate of around 0.40bp before and after the introduction of CLS, the one for ”No
Intraday Users” decreases from 0.70bp to 0.50bp.
r1 s s8−12 s12−16
(1) overall sample 0.77 -0.51 -0.10 -1.10
(2) before CLS 1.04 -0.52 -0.64 -0.52
(3) after CLS 0.66 -0.43 0.09 -1.11
(4) IN Users (before CLS) 0.50 -0.40 -0.34 -0.32
(5) IN Users (after CLS) 0.50 -0.42 0.10 -1.10
(6) No IN Users (before CLS) 2.94 -0.70 -1.20 -0.77
(7) No IN Users (after CLS) 2.78 -0.50 -0.02 -1.31
Table 1: Average hourly synthetic value (in bp)
5.2 Explaining the intraday term structure
As shown in subsection 5.1 the intraday term structure of the ON interest rate
deﬁnes a positive hourly rate in the money market. In this section we try to
explain the intraday term structure. The volume of unsettled payments in SIC
and the hourly outstanding intraday liquidity drawn from the SNB’s intraday
facility are taken as explanatory variables. Again we run the regression for the
entire sample (1), for the period before (2) and after the introduction of CLS (3)
as well as for the subgroups ”Intraday Users” (4)-(5) and ”No Intraday Users”
(6)-(7). The regression results are given in table 3.
In all regressions the volume of unsettled payments in SIC has a highly
signiﬁcant and positive inﬂuence on the intraday term structure of the ON
interest rate. We take this as evidence that higher liquidity stress, indicated
by the volume of unsettled payments, results in a higher hourly ON rate. The
inﬂuence of unsettled payments has decreased since the introduction of CLS.
For the ”No Intraday Users” the inﬂuence remains larger than for ”Intraday
Users”.
In regressions (3) and (5) the outstanding intraday volume yields highly
signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcients. In all other regressions the coeﬃcients are
insigniﬁcant. The eﬀect of intraday liquidity on ON rates is only evident for the
period after the introduction of CLS and only for the ”Intraday Users”. This
result can be attributed to the fact that intraday liquidity speciﬁc for CLS, which16
amounts to more than half of total intraday volume drawn, is made available
for the main accounts of CLS participants after noon. This additional liquidity
further boosts their settlement performance in SIC and reduced their liquidity
stress. The regression only accounts for the direct eﬀect of intraday liquidity
on the ON rates. Hence it is consistent that the hourly outstanding intraday
volume only exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on ”Intraday Users” willingness to
pay.
The smaller inﬂuence of unsettled payments on ON rates after the intro-
duction of CLS can mainly be attributed to the indirect beneﬁts of the SNB’s
intraday facility for both, ”Intraday Users” and ”No Intraday Users”. Tak-
ing into account that the intraday volume drawn has substantially increased
since September 2002 (see ﬁgure 1), the use of the SNB’s intraday facility has
attenuated liquidity stress resulting from unsettled payments. Unsettled pay-
ments have been reduced heavily over settlement hours after the introduction of
CLS. This says that the available intraday liquidity does not only yield a direct
positive eﬀect for ”Intraday Users” but indirectly aﬀects settlement for all mem-
bers via a smoother settlement, i.e. privately drawn intraday liquidity yields
a positive externality.18 Indeed, the hourly unsettled payments coeﬃcients are
reduced for both groups in regression (4) and (5) for ”Intraday Users” and (6)
and (7) for ”No Intraday Users”. Nevertheless, ”No Intraday Users” stay under
a higher liquidity pressure than do ”Intraday Users”, which explains why ”No
Intraday Users” willingness to pay is 2bp higher than that of ”Intraday Users”
(see discussion in subsection 5.1).
18If a bank draws intraday liquidity to settle payments early in the morning, all participants of the
payment system beneﬁt from additional intraday liquidity since they can settle their own payments
with incoming funds from other participants. This is true for both banking groups, whether or not
the receiver uses the SNB’s intraday facility.17
6 Comparisons and conclusions
The theoretical literature represented by VanHoose (1991) and Angelini (1998)
postulates the emergence of an intraday interest rate in the interbank market.
Baglioni/Monticini (2008) perceive the empirical evidence regarding the price
of intraday liquidity to be rare and inconclusive. Indeed, Angelini (2000) ﬁnds
no relevant intraday pattern in the level of interest rates for the ON market in
the Italian screen-based e-MID interbank market for the period from mid-1993
to end-1996. Looking at the same market, Barucci et.al. (2003) ﬁnd a downward
pattern for the period January 1999 to August 2001 and Baglioni/Monticini (2008)
ﬁnd a clear downward pattern for the period 2003 to 2004. For the unsecured
US ON federal funds market Bartolini et.al. (2005) ﬁnd a similar downward
pattern for the deviation of an average half hourly rate from the target rate in
the period from February 2002 to September 2004.
This paper provides further empirical evidence on the implicit price of in-
traday liquidity. Based on data from the secured ON market in Switzerland,
we show that a downward sloping intraday term structure has existed at least
since the introduction of the Swiss franc repo market in 1999. This is additional
evidence for the theoretical results by VanHoose (1991) and Angelini (1998).
Baglioni/Monticini (2008) explain the switch from no to a clear downward
pattern of the ON rate that took place between Angelini (2000) and their own
analysis by the introduction of real-time settlement and the PVP mechanism for
foreign exchange transactions (TARGET in 1999 and CLS in 2002). The move
towards gross settlement and PVP is claimed to have made intraday liquidity
more valuable and to have created incentives for banks to charge a price for it.
We ﬁnd corresponding evidence for these claims. The downward pattern
of the ON rate depends on the liquidity needs stemming from the RTGS sys-
tem. The implicit intraday interest rate positively depends on the correspond-
ing turnover and negatively on the outstanding volume of intraday liquidity.
We interpret this as evidence for the ”cost of immediacy” of RTGS systems
as postulated by Kahn/Roberds (2001). We also ﬁnd evidence for the posi-
tive externality of higher market liquidity that is claimed by Angelini (1998).
Higher market liquidity drives down pending payments for both groups of par-
ticipants, namely ”Intraday Users” and ”No Intraday Users”. Correspondingly,
both groups proﬁt from lower liquidity stress that results in a lower implicit
price of intraday liquidity.
Additionally, we provide empirical evidence that the introduction of CLS18
has increased the price of intraday liquidity. This is due to the strict pay-
in schedule of the CLS settlement cycle. CLS membership requires banks to
dispose of large amounts of intraday liquidity to meet the time critical CLS
pay-in schedule. As a consequence, the introduction of CLS has increased the
price of intraday liquidity for all banks. Since the introduction of CLS the level
of the ON rates stayed more or less constant from the beginning of the day until
the end of the CLS settlement cycle at noon. In the afternoon the implicit price
of intraday liquidity follows a clear downward pattern again.
The scarcity of intraday liquidity and the corresponding reaction of banks
to price intraday liquidity such as claimed by Baglioni/Monticini (2008) can
also be veriﬁed by evidence on the Swiss franc repo market. The introduction
of CLS resulted in banks applying diﬀerentiated pricing for banks that do and
those that do not make use of the SNB’s intraday credit facility. The latter pay
higher ON rates at the beginning of the day. After the introduction of CLS
the beginning of day diﬀerence does not disappear towards the end of the day
but keeps almost constant until the end of the day. We attribute this to the
segmented market structure and the non-anonymity of the market.
It is also interesting to compare the hourly implicit intraday interest rate of
the Euro with the one of the Swiss franc money market. The diﬀerence between
the beginning and end of day ON interest rate is 3.5bp for the Euro and 3bp for
the Swiss franc money market. In comparison to Baglioni/Monticini (2008), our
hourly interest rate measure is based on one hour less. Taking this into account,
the hourly implicit intraday interest rate is 0.5bp and 0.43bp for the Euro and
Swiss Franc money market respectively (see results for regression (3) in table 2).
Baglioni/Monticini (2008) point out, that the market intraday interest rate in
the US is pegged by the overdraft fee applied by the Fed. The annualized hourly
fee for overdraft is 1.5bp.19 Furﬁne (2001) derived the hourly implicit intraday
interest rate for the unsecured US money market and obtained a rate of 0.9bp.
Compared to the empirical evidence for the US and Euro money market the
hourly implicit intraday interest rate for the Swiss franc money market is thus
the lowest.20
Baglioni/Monticini (2008) argue that their estimate of the intraday interest
19See Baglioni/Monticini (2008), p. 1539 for the derivation of the annualized hourly fee.
20There is one basic diﬀerence between the hourly implicit intraday interest rate for CHF and the
ones for the Euro and the USD. The latter two results are based on the unsecured interbank money
market, whereas the former is based on the secured money market. However, to obtain the hourly
implicit intraday interest rate the diﬀerence is taken between the hourly ON rate and the overall
daily ON rate. Hence the risk premium related to the bank speciﬁc data is ﬁltered away by this
diﬀerencing. Therefore, results are comparable.19
rate provides an indirect evidence that the cost of collateralizing intraday loans
from the Eurosystem is lower than the fee charged by the Fed. This might
explain why the Fed investigates the introduction of an additional collateral-
ized intraday overdraft facility for Fedwire.21 Following this line of argument,
the diﬀerence between the hourly interest rate for Euro and Swiss Franc could
be traced back to structural diﬀerences between the respective intraday credit
facilities. One potential source could be transaction costs for which evidence is
hard to ﬁnd. Another source could be the respective collateral policies applied
by the two central banks. Whereas in the Eurosystem only Euro denominated
collateral is eligible, the SNB allows for a much wider variety of currencies.22
Since the SNB’s collateral policy allows for a greater diversiﬁcation in collateral
holdings, opportunity costs may be lower and as a result lead to a lower hourly
implicit intraday interest rate.
21See the Federal Reserve Board’s request for public comment on its proposed changes to its
daylight overdraft policy:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080228b.htm
22See Bank for International Settlement (2006) for more information on the respective collateral-
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